We study Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic epistemic game abstraction, which conveniently allows to represent the knowledge of the players about these deviations, and give a characterization of Nash equilibria in terms of winning strategies in the abstraction. We then use the abstraction to develop algorithms for some payoff functions. * This work has been supported by ERC project EQualIS (FP7-308087).
Introduction
Multiplayer concurrent games over graphs allow to model rich interactions between players. Those games are played as follows. In a state, each player chooses privately and independently an action, defining globally a move (one action per player); the next state of the game is then defined as the successor (on the graph) of the current state using that move; players continue playing from that new state, and form a(n infinite) play. Each player then gets a reward given by a payoff function (one function per player). In particular, objectives of the players may not be contradictory: those games are non-zero-sum games, contrary to two-player games used for controller or reactive synthesis [30, 23] . The problem of distributed synthesis [25] can be formulated using multiplayer concurrent games. In this setting, there is a global objective Φ, and one particular player called the Nature. The question then is whether the so-called grand coalition (that is, all players except the Nature) can enforce Φ, whatever does the Nature. While the players (except the Nature) try to cooperate (and can initially coordinate), their choice of actions (or strategy) can only depend on what they see from the play so far. When modelling distributed synthesis as concurrent games, information players receive is given via a partial observation function of the states of the game. Would the players have perfect monitoring of the play, would the distributed synthesis problem reduce to a standard two-player zero-sum game. Distributed synthesis is a fairly hot topic, both using the formalization via concurrent games we have already described and using the formalization via an architecture of processes [26] . The most general decidability results in the concurrent game setting are under the assumption of hierarchical observation [36, 7] (information received by the players is ordered) or more recently under recurring common knowledge [6] .
While distributed synthesis involves several players, this remains nevertheless a zerosum question. Using solution concepts borrowed from game theory, one can even go a bit further in describing the interactions between the players, and in particular in describing rational behaviours of the players. One of the most basic solution concepts very much studied by game theorists is that of Nash equilibria [24] . A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile where no player can improve her payoff by unilaterally changing her strategy. The outcome of a Nash equilibrium can therefore be seen as a rational behaviour of the system. While very much studied by game theoretists (e.g. over (repeated) matrix games), such a concept (and variants thereof) has been only rather recently studied over game graphs.
Probably the first works in that direction are [17, 15, 32, 33] . Several series of works have followed. To roughly give an idea of the existing results, pure Nash equilibria always exist in turn-based games for ω-regular objectives [35] but not in concurrent games games; they can nevertheless be computed [35, 9, 11] for large classes of objectives, though they may not exist in concurrent games, even with simple objectives. The problem becomes harder with mixed Nash equilibria, for which we often cannot decide the existence [34, 10] .
Computing Nash equilibria requires to (i) find a good behaviour of the system; (ii) detect deviations from that behaviour, and identify deviators; (iii) punish the deviators. This simple characterization of Nash equilibria is made explicit in [18] . Variants of Nash equilibria require slightly different ingredients, but they are mostly of a similar vein.
In (almost) all these works though, perfect monitoring is implicitely assumed: in all cases, players get full information on the states which are visited; a slight imperfect monitoring is assumed in some works on concurrent games (like [9] ), where actions which have been selected are not made available to all the players (we speak of hidden actions). This can yield some uncertainties for detecting deviator players, but this is rather limited and can be handled.
In this work, we therefore propose to integrate imperfect monitoring into the problem of computing (and first deciding the existence of) pure Nash equilibria. We decide to model imperfect monitoring via the notion of signal, which, given a joint decision of the players together with the next state the play will be in, gives some information to the players. To take further decisions, players get information from the signals they received, and have perfect recall about the past (their own actions and the signals received). We believe this is a meaningful framework. Let us give an example of a wireless network in which several devices try to send data: each device can modulate its transmit power, in order to maximise its bandwidth and reduce energy consumption as much as possible. However there might be a degradation of the bandwidth due to other devices, and the satisfaction of each device is measured as a compromise between energy consumption and bandwidth allocated, and is given by a quantitative payoff function. 1 In such a problem, it is natural to assume that a device only gets a global information about the load of the network, and not about each other device which is connected to the network. This can be expressed using imperfect monitoring via signals.
Following [31] in the framework of repeated matrix games, we put forward a notion of public signal (inspired by [31] ). A signal will be said public whenever it is common to all players. That is, after each move, all the players get the same information (their own action remains of course private). We will also distinguish several kinds of payoff functions, depending on whether they are publicly visible (that is, they only depend on the public signal), or privately visible (that is, they depend on the public signal and on private actions: the corresponding player knows his payoff!), or invisible (players may not even be sure of their payoff).
The payoff functions we will focus on in this paper are Boolean ω-regular payoff functions and mean-payoff objectives (noted MP thereafter). Some of the decidability results can be extended in various directions, which we will mention along the way.
As initial contributions of the paper, we show some undecidability results, and in partic-ular that the hypothesis of public signal solely is not sufficient to enjoy all nice decidability results: for MP payoff functions, which are privately visible, one cannot decide the constrained existence of a Nash equilibrium. Constrained existence of a Nash equilibrium asks for the existence of a Nash equilibrium whose payoff satisfies some given constraint.
The main contribution of the paper is the construction of a so-called epistemic game abstraction. This abstraction is a two-player turn-based game in which we show that winning strategies of one of the players (Eve) actually correspond to Nash equilibria in the original game. The winning condition for Eve is rather complex, but can be simplified in the case of publicly visible payoff functions. The epistemic game abstraction is inspired by both the epistemic unfolding of [5] used for distributed synthesis, and the suspect game abstraction of [9] used to compute Nash equilibria in concurrent games with hidden actions. In our abstraction, we nevertheless not fully formalize epistemic unfoldings, and concentrate on the structure of the knowledge which is useful under the assumption of public signals; we show that several subset constructions (as done initially in [27] , and since then used in various occasions, see e.g. [14, 20, 19, 22] ) made in parallel, are sufficient to represent the knowledge of all the players. The framework of [9] happens to be a special case of the public signal monitoring framework of the current paper. This paper can therefore be seen as an extension of the suspect game abstraction.
This generic construction can be applied to several frameworks with publicly visible payoff functions. We give two such applications, one with Boolean ω-regular payoff functions and one to mean-payoff payoff functions.
Further related works.
We have already discussed several kinds of related works. Let us give some final remarks on related works.
We have mentioned earlier that one of the problems for computing Nash equilibria is to detect deviations and players who deviated. Somehow, the epistemic game abstraction tracks the potential deviators, and even though players might not know who exactly did the deviation (there are then several suspects), then one can try to punish all potential suspects. And that what we do here. Very recently, [8] discusses the detection of deviators, and give some conditions for deviators to become common knowledge of the other players. In our framework, even though deviators may not become fully common knowledge, we can design mechanisms to punish relevant deviators.
Recently imperfect information has also been introduced in the setting of multi-agent temporal logics [20, 21, 2, 3] , and the main decidability results assume hierarchical information. However, while those logics allow to express rich interactions, it can somehow only consider qualitative properties. Furthermore, no firm complexity bounds are provided.
In [11] , a deviator game abstraction is proposed. It twists the suspect game abstraction [9] to allow for more general solution concepts (so-called robust equilibria), but it assumes visibility of actions (hence remove any kind of uncertainties). Relying on results of [13] , this deviator game abstraction allows to compute equilibria with mean-payoff payoff functions. Our algorithms for mean-payoff payoff functions will also rely on the polyhedron problem of [13] .
Definitions

Concurrent multiplayer games with signals
We consider the model of concurrent multi-player games, based on the two-player model of [1] . This model of games was used for instance in [9] . We equip games with signals, which will give information to the players.
Definition 1.
A concurrent game with signals is a tuple
Agt is a finite set of players, Act is a finite set of actions, Σ is a finite alphabet, Allow : V × Agt → 2 Act \ {∅} is a mapping indicating the actions available to a given player in a given state, 2 Tab : V × Act Agt → V associates, with a given state and a given move of the players (i.e., an element of Act Agt ), the state resulting from that move,
We say that the game has public signal if there is :
The signals will help the players monitor the game: for taking decisions, a player will have the information given by her signal and the action she played earlier. A public signal will be a common information given to all the players. Our notion of public signal is inspired by [31] and encompasses the model of [9] where only action names were hidden to the players.
An element of Act Agt is called a move. When an explicit order is given on the players Agt = {A 1 , . . . , A |Agt| }, we will write a move m = (m A ) A∈Agt as m A1 , . . . , m A |Agt| . If m ∈ Act Agt and A ∈ Agt, we write m(A) for the A-component of m and m(−A) for all but the A components of m. In particular, we write m
We write Hist G (v 0 ) (or simply Hist if G and v 0 are clear in the context) for the set of full histories in G that start at v 0 . If h ∈ Hist(v 0 ) and h ∈ Hist(last(h)), then we write h · h for the obvious concatenation of both histories (it then belongs to Hist(v 0 )). Let A ∈ Agt be a player. The projection of h for A is denoted π A (h) and is defined by
This will be the information available to player A: it contains both the actions she played so far and the signal she received. Note that we assume perfect recall, that is, while playing, A will remember all her past knowledge, that is, all of π A (h) if h has been played so far. We define the undistinguishability relation ∼ A as the equivalence relation over full histories induced by π A : for two histories h and h , h ∼ A h iff π A (h) = π A (h ). While playing, if h ∼ A h , A will not be able to know whether h or h has been played. We also define the 3 We extend all the above notions to infinite sequences in a straightforward way and to the notion of full play.
In the following, we will say that the game G has publicly (resp. privately) visible payoffs whenever for every A ∈ Agt,
Otherwise they are said invisible. Private and public visibility of payoffs, while not always assumed (see for instance [19, 3] ) are reasonable assumptions: using only her knowledge, a player knows her payoff. Public visibility is more restrictive, but will be required for some of the results.
Let A ∈ Agt be a player. A strategy for player A from v 0 is a mapping σ A :
A strategy profile is a tuple σ Agt = (σ A ) A∈Agt , where, for every player A ∈ Agt, σ A is a strategy for player A. The strategy profile is said info-compatible whenever each σ A is A -compatible. We write out(σ Agt , v 0 ) for the unique full play from v 0 , which is an outcome of all strategies part of σ Agt .
When σ Agt is a strategy profile and σ A a player-A strategy, we use the notation σ Agt [A/σ A ] to denote the strategy profile where A plays according to σ A , and each other player B plays according to σ B . The strategy σ A is a deviation of player A from profile σ Agt . Note there are A-deviations that will not be observable by some other players, and that a given player C may not distinguish between some A-deviations and some B-deviations. Definition 2. A(n info-compatible) Nash equilibrium from v 0 is an info-compatible strategy profile σ such that for every A ∈ Agt, for every player-A A -compatible strategy σ A , payoff A (out(σ, v 0 )) ≥ payoff A (out(σ[A/σ A ], v 0 )). We will simply speak of Nash equilibrium in the following.
Note that deviations need not be info-compatible, since the only meaningful part of σ A is along the outcome out(σ[A/σ A ], v 0 ), where there are no ∼ A -equivalent histories; hence any deviation can be made info-compatible without affecting its profitability.
Payoff functions. In the following we will consider various payoff functions. Let Φ be an ω-regular property over some alphabet Γ. The function pay Φ : Γ ω → {0, 1} is defined by, for every a ∈ Γ ω , pay Φ (a) = 1 if and only if a |= Φ. A publicly (resp. privately) visible payoff function payoff A for player A is said associated with Φ over Σ (resp. Act × Σ) whenener it is
crops the first v 0 ). Such a payoff function is called a Boolean ω-regular payoff function.
Let Γ be a finite alphabet and w : Γ → Z be a weight assigning a value to every letter of that alphabet. We define two payoff functions over Γ ω by, for every a = (a i ) i≥1 ∈ Γ ω , pay MP w (a) = lim inf n→∞ n i=1 w(a i ) and pay MPw (a) = lim sup n→∞ n i=1 w(a i ). A publicly visible payoff function payoff A for player A is said associated with the liminf (resp. limsup) mean-payoff of w whenener it is defined by payoff A (ρ) = pay MP w ( A (ρ)) (resp. pay MPw ( A (ρ))). A privately visible payoff function payoff A for player A is said associated with the liminf (resp. limsup) mean-payoff of w whenener it is defined by payoff A (ρ) = pay MP w (π A (ρ) −v0 ) (resp. pay MPw (π A (ρ) −v0 )).
A payoff function payoff : V × (Act Agt × V ) ω → D is said prefix-independent whenever for every full play ρ, for every suffix ρ ≥i of ρ, payoff(ρ) = payoff(ρ ≥i ).
Example 3.
We now illustrate most notions on the game of Fig. 1 . This is a game with three players A 1 , A 2 and A 3 , and which is played basically in two steps, starting at v 0 . Graphically an edge labelled a 1 , a 2 , a 3 between two vertices v and v represents the fact that a i ∈ Allow(v, A i ) for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and that v = Tab(v, a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ). Furthermore, as a convention, * stands for both characters a and b, whereas − denotes the fact that the corresponding player has no real choice (the set of allowed action is a singleton). For readability bottom states explicitely indicate the payoffs of the three players (same order as for actions) if the game ends in that vertex.
After the first step of the game, the players see the public signal as indicated with colors yellow and green. Hence the histories v 0 · a, b, a ·v 2 and v 0 · a, a, a ·v 1 are undistinguishable by A 1 and A 3 (same action, same signal), but they can be distinguished by A 2 because of different actions (even if same signal).
In bold red, we have depicted a strategy profile, which is actually a Nash equilibrium. We will analyze the possible deviations in this game to see this.
First there is an A 2 -deviation to v 1 . This deviation is invisible to both players A 1 and A 3 . For this reason, the strategy out of v 1 for A 1 is to play a (same as out of v 2 ) as well (since A 1 is not aware of the deviation). On the other hand, even though this would be profitable to him, A 1 cannot deviate from v 1 , since we are in a branch where A 2 has already deviated, and at most one player is allowed to deviate at a time (and anyway A 1 does not know that they are in state v 1 ). There is an A 1 -deviation from v 2 to 0, 1, 0, which is not profitable to A 1 . On the other hand, there is no possible deviation to v 3 , since this would require two players to change their actions simultaneously (A 1 and A 2 ). Then, there is an A 1 -deviation to v 4 and another A 3 -deviation to v 5 . A 2 knows there has been a deviation (because of the green public signal), but she doesn't know who has deviated and whether the game proceeds to v 4 or v 5 
a , a , b a,a,a * , b , a Figure 1 An example of a concurrent game with public signal (yellow and green: public signal). Edges in red and bold are part of the strategy profile. Dashed edges are the possible deviations. One can notice that none of the deviations is profitable to the deviator, hence the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. Convention in the drawing: edges with no label are for complementary labels.
Remark. To be fully formal, we use rather heavy notations for concurrent games. We will use them for the main technical construction of the paper (the epistemic game abstraction), but we will allow ourselves simpler notations in other proofs (undecidability and complexity reductions). For instance, instead of fully defining components Allow and Tab for a concurrent game, we will better write transitions q a1,a2,a3
Two-player turn-based game structures
Two-player turn-based game structures are specific cases of the previous model, where at each vertex, at most one player has more than one action in her set of allowed actions. But for convenience, we will give a simplified definition here, with only objects that will be useful.
A two-player turn-based game structure is a tuple G = S, S Eve , S Adam , s init , A, Allow, Tab , where S = S Eve S Adam is a finite set of states (states in S Eve belong to Eve whereas states in S Adam belong to Adam), s init ∈ S is the initial state, A is a finite alphabet, Allow : S → 2 A \ {∅} gives the sets of available actions, and Tab : : S×A → S is the next-state function. If s ∈ S Eve (resp. S Adam ), Allow(s) is the set of actions allowed to Eve (resp. Adam) in state s.
In this context, strategies will see sequences of states and actions, with full information. Note that we do not include any winning condition or payoff function in the tuple, hence the name structure.
The problems we are looking at
The problem we are looking at is the constrained existence of a Nash equilibrium. For simplicity, we define constraints using non-strict thresholds constraints, but could well impose more involved constraints, like Boolean combinations of linear constraints.
Problem 1 (Constrained existence problem). Given a game with signals
can we decide whether there exists a Nash equilibrium σ Agt from v init such that for every
If the constraint on the payoff is trivial (that is, ν A = −∞ and ν A = +∞ for every A ∈ Agt), we simply speak of the existence problem.
First undecidability results
Undecidability of the problem for general signals and publicly visible Boolean ω-regular objectives.
Using the model of concurrent games with signals we can express the grand-coalition problem in games with imperfect information of [4, 5] (which is strongly related to the distributed synthesis problem [26] ). We can therefore easily infer undecidability of the constrained existence and then of the existence problem, even for simple Boolean payoff functions and few players.
Theorem 4. The existence problem in games with signals is undecidable with three players and publicly visible Boolean ω-regular payoff functions.
Proof. A game of imperfect information as defined in [4] can be seen as a concurrent game, with an extra player to resolve the non-determinism allowed in the former model, and signals that only depend on the current visited vertex. Following this modelization, the grandcoalition problem then asks whether there are info-compatible strategies for the original players (they form the so-called "grand-coalition"), such that for every strategy of the extra player, the outcome of the resulting strategy profile satisfies the given winning condition (for instance an ω-regular winning condition). It is known that the grand-coalition question is undecidable, already for reachability properties and two players [4] . Such a reachability can be obviously made publicly visible to the players (by revealing it when it is reached).
We will explain how this can be coded into a constrained existence problem over the same game, with three players and Boolean ω-regular payoff functions. We assign to each of the original players a Boolean payoff function corresponding to their original ω-regular winning condition Φ, and to the extra player a Boolean payoff function corresponding to the negation of Φ. The grand-coalition has a winning strategy in the initial game if and only if there is a Nash equilibrium in the new game, where the original players have a payoffs 1 (which implies that the extra player has payoff 0, but cannot improve). This shows the undecidability of the constrained existence problem.
Using a trick already used in [9] , we can extend this undecidability proof to the existence problem as follows. Let G be the game above with objective Φ, and build G as on the next picture. Original players appear first in the action tuples, say they are ordered as
The new initial vertex is v init , and from there, A 1 and A extra play a matching-penny game (symbol "−" indicates that the other players have a single action, with no impact). The new payoff functions are as follows:
whenever the game ends in v , or gets what payoff Ai was giving A i if the game proceeds to G;
Player A extra gets 0 whenever the game ends in v , or gets what payoff Aextra was giving her if the game proceeds to G. We will see that there is a Nash equilibrium in G if and only if there is a Nash equilibrium where all players except A extra gets 1 in G.
Indeed, assume that σ Agt is a Nash equilibrium in G where all players except A extra gets 1. Then playing −, . . . , −, a, b followed by σ Agt is a Nash equilibrium in G .
Conversely assume there is a Nash equilibrium σ Agt in G . Assume that the outcome of σ Agt goes to G. Since A N has no profitable deviation, this means that A N has payoff 1 along that outcome (otherwise A N would deviate to v ). Then the strategy profile after v init is a suitable Nash equilibrium in G. Assume now that the outcome of σ Agt goes to v . Since A extra has no profitable deviation, this means in particular that the strategy profile which plays according to σ Agt after v init is a suitable Nash equilibirum in G.
Undecidability of the problem for public signals and private visible mean-payoff payoff functions
We show here that public payoff functions (hence somehow public signals) are necessary to have our main result (Theorem 21). We argue this in the framework of mean-payoff functions.
Theorem 5. One cannot decide the constrained existence of a Nash equilibrium in a game with public signals, for a mixture of limsup and liminf mean-payoff functions 4 which are privately visible. Even for two players.
Proof. To prove this, we use the undecidability of blind mean-payoff games [19] . In a twoplayer turn-based game where the first player is blind (that is, it can only observe that actions happen, but not get any information on the states the game is visiting), we cannot decide whether the first player can achieve a positive limsup (or liminf) mean-payoff. Note: in this game, the first player cannot see the encountered weights. Somehow, the payoff function is invisible.
Let G be a mean-payoff game, in which Eve is assumed to be blind. We assume that the payoff function of Eve is a limsup payoff function given by weight w (that is, MP w ). We assume "−" is a fresh symbol not used in game G. The alphabet of actions of G is the one fo G, plus that fresh symbol. Further assume that W is the maximal absolute weight value appearing in the game. We construct the new concurrent game G as follows:
it has two players,
we have an additional edge lost −,− − −−− → lost, and ( −, − , lost) = lost we write transform(e) for the set of transformed edges from e as described above w A1 assigns 0 to every edge for every edge e in G, for every e ∈ transform(e), w A2 (transform(e)) = −w(e) for e = lost −,− − −−− → lost, we set w A2 (e ) = −W − 1 We assume that the payoff for player A 2 is given by MP w A 2 (liminf). The choice for A 1 does not matter (the payoff of all plays is 0)... Note that the signal is public and that the payoff functions are privately visible for the respective players. Also note that A 1 has no incentive to deviate (since the weight is 0 everywhere), and that player A 2 has no better strategy than to copy A 1 from (former) Eve-states (otherwise the game proceeds to state lost and A 2 gets the worst he can get). The only way to improve his payoff is therefore to deviate in some previous Adam-state.
We show that Eve has a winning strategy in the original blind game G to achieve MP w > 0 if and only if there is a Nash equilibrium in the new game G where MP w A 2 < 0.
Let
Conversely pick a winning strategy σ Eve for Eve ensuring MP w > 0. Since Eve is blind, σ Eve can be seen as a single word. Against that (fixed) strategy, Adam has an optimal counter-strategy σ Adam in G (the possible choices of Adam, given the strategy of Eve, can be represented as an infinite tree, and at any stage he can choose the best subtree; hence Adam has an optimal strategy!). At each length of the joint outcome prefix, a single choice has to be made, hence this Adam-strategy can be made blind (we define it as a single word, representing the choives along the joint outcome); we extend the strategy to other histories by enforcing -compatibility. Assume A 1 plays according to σ Eve and A 2 according to σ Adam . Let ρ be the outcome of these two strategies. Then A 2 has no profitable deviation (since Adam was playing optimally against σ Eve ) and since MP w (ρ) > 0, it is the case that MP w A 2 (ρ) < 0. So, this is a Nash equilibrium satisfying the required constraint.
Discussion. While the first undecidability result is not very surprising, since allowing arbitrary private signals can really complexify the structure of players' knowledge, we believe that the second result justifies a restriction to public payoff functions to get decidability results. We also believe that the second result is an argument for restricting to public signal. Indeed, a hierarchical signal, as standardly done in distributed synthesis, will only make sense with privately visible payoff functions, hence this will be undecidable.
In the following we will focus on public signals and develop an epistemic game abstraction, which will record and track possible deviations in the game. This will then be applied to two frameworks with publicly visible payoff functions.
3
The epistemic game abstraction Building over [9] and [5] , we construct an abstraction game (or epistemic game), which will record possible behaviours of the system, together with possible unilateral deviations. In [5] , notions of epistemic Kripke structures are used to really track/structure the precise knowledge of the players. These are mostly useful since undistinguishable states (expressed using signals here) are assumed arbitrary (no hierarchical structure). We could do the same here, but we think that would be overly complex and hide the real structure of knowledge in the framework of public signals. We therefore prefer to stick to simpler subset constructions, which are more commonly used (see e.g. [27] or later [14, 19, 22] ), though it has to be a bit more involved here since there are multiple players.
Let G = V, v init , Agt, Act, Σ, Allow, Tab, , (payoff A ) A∈Agt be a concurrent game with public signal. We will first give the construction of the abstraction, and then show its correctness. This will be used later for decidability and algorithmics purposes.
Construction of the game structure
In the following, we write Agt ⊥ for Agt ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ is a fresh symbol. We build the two-player turn-based game structure E G = S Eve , S Adam , s init , Σ , Allow , Tab as follows. The idea is to track possible states the game can be in, based on information that the various players have.
Eve's states are:
Intuitively, state ι ⊥ (s) is where the game is if no deviation has occurred. States in ι A (s) correspond to states the game can be in if a deviation by player A has occurred. In type-1 states, deviations cannot be detected by other players, whereas in type-2 states, deviations can be detected, even though the player who has deviated may not be identified by (some) other players. 
The intuition behind this definition is that we have to allow any single-player deviation, hence the constraint (iii). Now, if a state is already due to some deviation (case A ∈ Agt is a real player), then only that player can deviate from now on (hence condition (i)). 
, then s is type-2, and defined using sets ι A (s ) as in the previous case (hence the only difference is that there is no ⊥-state: everyone knows that someone has deviated). if s is type-2, then s is type-2, and each ι(s ) is defined only by the second set in the initial case.
States of this game will be called epistemic states. We write S ⊥ for the set of type-1 states. A full play along which all Eve-states are type-1 is called a ⊥-play.
Interpretation of this abstraction
We first explain how full histories and plays of E G can be interpreted as full histories and plays of G. The idea is that Eve makes suggestions regarding the moves toplay to build a Nash equilibria, and either all players follow the suggestion, or one of the players decides to deviate from this suggestion.
Fix a type-1 Eve-state 
This corresponds to a deviation by player A, and i 0 is the position at which player A has started deviating from the main outcome. We write concrete(H) for this whole set of histories, concrete ⊥ (H) for the set of histories of the first type (it contains at most one history, which is the real concrete history suggested by Eve), and concrete A (H) for the set of histories of the second type; they will correspond to deviations by player A.
We will now state several properties, which will explicit the information stored in the (states of the) epistemic game abstraction.
Lemma 6. The set concrete ⊥ (H) contains at most one element, and it has exactly one element if and only if s
The set concrete ⊥ (H), if non-empty, stores the real history of the game, if no deviation has occurred. On the other hand, there can be deviations of one of the players; they will appear in concrete A (H) (meaning that A has deviated). As long as states of H are type-1, those deviations will somehow be invisible to other players, whereas when we will reach type-2 states, those deviations will partly be visible to other players. 
The set concrete ⊥ (H), if non-empty, stores the real history of the game, if no deviation has occurred. On the other hand, there can be deviations of one of the players; they will appear in concrete A (H) (meaning that A has deviated). As long as states of H are type-1, those deviations will somehow be invisible to other players, whereas when we will reach type-2 states, those deviations will partly be visible to other players.
We now explain how the structure of E G explicit the undistinguishability relations of the players. For j ∈ {1, 2}, we let B j ∈ Agt ⊥ \ {A} such that h j ∈ concrete Bj (H) with index
Player A only sees h j through its π A -projection, that is:
Now, since M i ∈ Allow (s i ) for every i, the condition defining that set implies that m 1
Lemma 11. Let A ∈ Agt, pick h 1 = h 2 ∈ concrete(H), and assume that h 1 ∼ A h 2 . Then none of the h i 's belongs to concrete A (H).
Proof. We use the notations h
as in the previous proof. Towards a contradiction assume that h 1 ∈ concrete A (H) with index i 1 0 : then (i) for every i < i 1 0 ,
Is that possible that h 2 = concrete ⊥ (H)? If this is the case, then for every i,
for every B = A, for every i > i 1 0 , m 1
it is also the case that for every i, m 1 i (A) = m 2 i (A). Hence we conclude that m 1 i = m 2 i for every i. This is not possible since h 1 = h 2 . Is that possible that h 2 ∈ concrete A (H) with index i 2 0 ? Then (i) for every i < i 2 0 ,
for every i as well. Hence h 1 = h 2 , which contradicts the assumption.
Is that possible that h 2 ∈ concrete B (H) with B = A with index i 2 0 ? First notice that the prefix of H until index i 1 0 only contains ⊥-play (deviations of one single player can only first happen from a ⊥-state). We write v i the vertex such that ι ⊥ (s i ) = {v i }. We write m i = M i (v i , ⊥) for every i ≤ i 1 0 , and h ⊥ the real path without any deviation up to index i 1 0 . By Lemma 10, h ⊥ ∼ Aĥ2 , whereĥ 2 is the prefix of h 2 up to position i 1 0 . It is then the case that m 2 i (A) = m i (A) for every i ≤ i 1 0 . Now, since A deviates precisely at that position, m 1 i (A) = m i (A). This implies m 1 i (A) = m 2 i (A), which contradicts h 1 ∼ A h 2 . We therefore conclude that h 1 cannot be in concrete A (H). And so does h 2 , which concludes the proof.
Assuming public visibility of the original payoff functions in G, we can define when R is a full play in E G , and A ∈ Agt, payoff A (R) = payoff A (ρ), where ρ ∈ concrete(R).
Lemma 12. Assuming public visibility of the original payoff functions in G, the payoff function payoff
It is sufficient to notice that ρ, ρ ∈ concrete(R) imply (ρ) = (ρ ). Hence for every A ∈ Agt, payoff A (ρ) = payoff A (ρ ). Therefore, payoff A (R) does not depend on the choice of the witness ρ.
Winning condition of Eve
A zero-sum game will be played on the game structure E G , and the winning condition of Eve will be given on the branching structure of the set of outcomes of a strategy for Eve, and not individually on each outcome. Let p = (p A ) A∈Agt , and σ Eve be a strategy for Eve in E G ; it is said winning for p from s 0 whenever payoff(concrete ⊥ (out ⊥ (σ Eve , s 0 ))) = p, where out ⊥ (σ Eve , s 0 ) is the unique outcome of σ Eve from s 0 which is a ⊥-play, and for every
For every epistemic state s = ((v, ⊥), (V A , A) A∈Agt ) or s = ((V A , A) A∈Agt ), we define the set of suspect players susp(s) = {A ∈ Agt | V A = ∅} (this is the set of players that may have deviated). By extension, if R = s 0
. ., we define susp(R) = lim k→∞ susp(s k ). Note that the sequence (susp(s k )) k is a non-increasing sequence, hence it stabilizes.
Assuming public visibility of the payoff functions, the winning condition of Eve can be rewritten as: σ Eve is winning for p from s 0 whenever payoff (out ⊥ (σ Eve , s 0 )) = p, and for every R ∈ out(σ Eve , s 0 ), for every A ∈ susp(R), payoff A (R) ≤ p A .
Correction of the epistemic abstraction
The epistemic abstraction tracks everything that is required to detect Nash equilibria in the original game, which we make explicit in the next result. Theorem 13. There is a Nash equilibrium in G with payoff p from v init if and only if Eve has a winning strategy for p in E G from s init .
The proof of this theorem will highlight a correspondence between Nash equilibria in G and winning strategies of Eve in E G . In this correspondence, the main outcome of the equilibrium in G is the unique ⊥-concretisation of ⊥-play generated by the winning strategy of Eve.
Proof. Assume first that σ Agt = (σ A ) A∈Agt is a Nash equilibrium in the original game G from v 0 with payoff p. We define a strategy σ Eve for Eve in the epistemic game E G , which we will show is winning from s 0 for p.
If some coordinate is not definable that way, we set it arbitrarily.
We need to show that this is well-defined. Pick h, h ∈ concrete(H) \ concrete A (H). By Lemma 10, h ∼ A h . Hence we deduce that σ A (h) = σ A (h), which implies that σ Eve is well-defined and that σ Eve (H) ∈ Allow (last(H)).
We now show that σ Eve is a winning strategy from s 0 for p. First notice that out(σ Agt , v 0 ) coincides with the unique element ρ ⊥ of concrete ⊥ (out ⊥ (σ Eve , s 0 )), hence payoff(ρ ⊥ ) = p.
; and (m i , v i+1 ) = β i for every i. From ρ we design a deviation σ A for player A in G as follows:
for every prefix ρ ≤i of ρ (this is v 0
; we extend σ A to histories that are undistinguishable by A from some ρ ≤i ; we set σ A (h) = σ A (h) for all other histories h. By construction, this is a well-defined info-compatible strategy for player A in G. We use it as a deviation w.r.t. σ Agt . Since σ Agt is a Nash equilibrium, it is the case that payoff A (out(σ Agt [A/σ A ], v 0 )) ≤ payoff A (out(σ Agt , v 0 )) = p A . By construction we have ρ = out(σ Agt [A/σ A ], v 0 ), and therefore payoff A (ρ) ≤ p A . We conclude that σ Eve is a winning strategy.
Conversely consider a winning strategy σ Eve from s 0 in the epistemic game E G . When we build the strategy profile σ Agt , we need not only to check the main outcome, but also to somehow foresee the possible deviations. We build σ Agt inductively on the length of histories. We maintain the following invariant: For all histories of length at most i, which can be obtained as generated by σ Agt or by a deviation by a unique player, we know a (partial) function f i : Hist G → Hist E G such that: (iv) if h is a prefix of out(σ Agt , v 0 ), then f i (h) is a prefix of out ⊥ (σ Eve , s 0 ) and h is the unique element of concrete ⊥ (f i (h));
The base case i = 0 is obvious, since there is a single history of length 0 both in G and in E G . We assume we have proven the result for i. We first initialize f i+1 as f i on dom(f i ). Then, we consider a length-i outcome h of either σ Agt (no deviation so far) or of
If there is only one such h, then this is well-defined.
Otherwise, pick two such distinct outcomes h and h such that
, hence the profile σ Agt is properly defined (values of σ Agt outside the above domain is not important and can be set arbitrarily).
Further define f i+1 as follows:
Let h be the length-i outcome of σ Agt from v 0 . Then the history h = h Conditions (i)-(v) are now easy to get, by definition of the various objects. It remains to show condition (vi). Assume that h j mj − − → v j (with j = 1, 2) are two different length-(i + 1) outcomes in the domain of f i+1 , and assume that h 1
. This value is the same for both j = 1 and j = 2. Hence point (vi) is now proven. This concludes the induction step.
We now show that σ Agt is a Nash equilibrium from v 0 . We first define the function f as the limit of the sequence (f i ) i∈N : f can speak of finite histories and infinite plays. Let ρ = out(σ Agt , v 0 ). By (iv) characterizing f , we get that f (ρ) = out ⊥ (σ Eve , s 0 ) and ρ is the unique element of concrete ⊥ (f (ρ)). Since σ Eve is winning with payoff p, we get that p = payoff(ρ).
Consider some A-deviation σ A , and write ρ = out(σ Agt [A/σ A ], v 0 ). By (ii) and (v), we deduce ρ ∈ dom(f ), f (ρ ) ∈ out(σ Eve , s 0 ) and ρ ∈ concrete A (f (ρ )). Since σ Eve is a winning strategy for Eve, we get that payoff A (ρ ) ≤ p A . That is, there is no profitable deviation for every A ∈ Agt: σ Agt is a Nash equilibrium with payoff p.
Remarks on the construction
We have not formalized the epistemic unfolding as it is made in [5] . We believe we do not really learn anything for public signal using it. And the above extended subset construction can much better be understood.
One could argue that this epistemic game gives more information to the players, since Eve explicitely gives to everyone the move that should played. But in the real game, the players also have that information, which is obtained by an initial coordination of the players (the players initially agree with the joint rational behaviour). Players indeed need coordination to achieve equilibria.
Finally, let us notice that the espitemic game constructed here generalizes the suspect game construction of [9] , where all players have perfect information on the states of the game, but cannot see the actions that are precisely played. Somehow, games in [9] have a public signal telling the state the game is in (that is, (m, v) = v). So, in the suspect game of [9] , the sole uncertainty is in the players that may have deviated, not in the set of states that are visited.
Remark. Let us analyze the size of the epistemic game abstraction.
The size of the alphabet is bounded by |Σ| + |Act| |Agt|·|V |·(1+|Agt|) . Since |Σ| is bounded by |V | · |Act| |Agt| , the size of the alphabet is in O(|Act| |Agt| 2 ·|V | )
The number of states is therefore in O(2 |Agt|·|V | · |Act| |Agt| 2 ·|V | ). The epistemic game is therefore of exponential size w.r.t. the initial game. Note that we could reduce the bounds by using tricks like those in [9, Prop. 4.8] , but this would remain exponential.
Example
We consider again the example of Fig. 1, and we assume that the public signal when reaching the leaves of the game is uniformly orange. Then we depict (part of) the epistemic game abstraction of the game on Fig. 2 . For readability, we label each state s of Eve as tuples containing information about each A ∈ Agt ⊥ . A line (V A , A) then means that ι A (s) = V A . One can notice that from Eve-states s 1 and s 2 , moves are multi-dimensional, in the sense that there is one move per state appearing in the state. There are nevertheless compatibility conditions to be satisfied (expressed in condition Allow ); for instance, from s 2 , player A 2 does not distinguish between the two options ((i) A 1 has deviated and the game is in v 4 , and (ii) A 3 has deviated and the game is in v 5 ), hence the action of player A 2 should be the same in the two moves (a in the depicted example, written in red). 
Algorithmics for publicly visible payoffs
While the construction of the epistemic game has transformed the computation of Nash equilibria in a concurrent game with public signal to the computation of winning strategies in a two-player zero-sum turn-based game, since the winning condition is rather complex, we cannot apply standard algorithms out-of-the-box. We let G = V, v init , Agt, Act, Σ, Allow, Tab, , (payoff A ) A∈Agt be a concurrent game with public signal, and we let E G = S Eve , S Adam , s init , Act Agt ∪ Σ, Allow , Tab be its epistemic game abstraction.
In this section, otherwise specified, we assume public visibility and prefix-independence of payoff functions. We recall this notion here: A payoff function payoff : V ×(Act Agt ×V ) ω → D is said prefix-independent whenever for every full play ρ, for every suffix ρ ≥i of ρ, payoff(ρ) = payoff(ρ ≥i ).
Thanks to Lemma 12 (see page 14) , one can therefore attach to every full play R of E G , an |Agt|-dimensional payoff vector payoff (R) = (payoff A (R)) A∈Agt . We then recall here the winning condition for Eve in E G : a strategy σ Eve is winning whenever there exists some p = (p A ) A∈Agt such that payoff (out ⊥ (σ Eve , s 0 )) = p, and for every R ∈ out(σ Eve , s 0 ), for every A ∈ susp(R), payoff A (R) ≤ p A .
First reduction
In the following we write R = R ∪ {−∞, +∞}. We define the value of epistemic state s as follows:
The set value(s) is upward-closed, and we want to compute a representation thereof. Note that for all agents A ∈ Agt \ susp(s), one can represent possible values for A by −∞.
Somehow, the set value(s) stores the possible payoffs than one should achieve along the main outcome of a candidate Nash equilibrium when a deviation to s may happen. Otherwise, one of the suspect players will manage to deviate and have a larger payoff. This is formalized as follows.
Lemma 14.
Eve has a winning strategy in E G from s 0 for payoff vector p if and only there
such that p = (payoff A (R)) A∈Agt , and for every history s 0
In the above lemma, s 0
− −− → s corresponds to a prefix of R with a one-step deviation from an Adam-state.
Proof. Assume σ Eve is a winning strategy for Eve in E G . Let R = out ⊥ (σ Eve , s 0 ) be the main outcome of σ Eve from s 0 , and p its payoff. For all R ∈ out(σ Eve , s 0 ), for every A ∈ susp(R),
where all but the last move follow R. Consider the strategy σ Eve , such that for every history H starting at s, σ Eve (H ) = σ Eve (H · H ). Then, for every R ∈ out(σ Eve , s), H · R ∈ out(σ Eve , s 0 ). Hence, since σ Eve is winning, for every R ∈ out(σ Eve , s), for every
Conversely assume R is a ⊥-play with payoff p, and such that it satisfies the hypotheses of the lemma, and for every state s resulting from a single-move deviation of R, let σ s be a strategy witnessing the fact that p ∈ value(s). Define σ Eve as a strategy following R along the prefixes of R, and which plays according to σ s when Adam deviates from R at state s. Then it is not difficult to see that this is a winning strategy for Eve in E G .
Together with Theorem 13, this lemma reduces the problem of computing Nash equilibria (for prefix-independent payoff functions) in the original game to:
(i) the computation of (representatives of) the sets value(s) when s ∈ S Eve \ S ⊥ (ii) the search of a ⊥-play satisfying the constraints of the lemma.
Generic procedure to compute the value sets for prefix-independent payoffs
The game E G has a specific structure, in which the set of suspects along a play is nonincreasing (and stabilizing...), as soon as we leave the (main) ⊥-part of the game. We will use this structure to design a generic bottom-up procedure to compute the values of states in the non-⊥-part of E G . We make the following hypothesis. We have an oracle which, given a tuple G = S, S Eve , S Adam , s init , A, Allow, Tab , S out , γ, δ , where the first component is a turn-based game structure, S out ⊆ S is a set of output states such that for every s ∈ S out , for every a ∈ Allow(s), Tab(s, a) = s, 6 We will define subgames of E G , where sets of suspects will be fixed. The idea is that, within such a game, the payoff reduces to a multi-dimensional standard payoff function, with nodes connected to lower components (where the set of suspects is reduced). Then using a bottom-up computation, we will compute the value sets in all states of S Eve \ S ⊥ in E G .
We formalize this idea now. Inductively, we define for every S ⊆ Agt a core game We assume that for every set S = S ⊆ S, we have shown that for every s such that
Pick a strategy σ Eve in E G from s that witnesses some w ∈ value(s). Pick an outcome R of σ Eve which leaves Core susp(s) (viewed as a subarena of E G ) at state s ∈ S susp(s) out after prefix H. Write S = susp(s ). Then σ Agt after prefix H achieves w as well (by prefix-independence): w ∈ value(s ) By induction hypothesis, w |S ∈ val Core S (s ), hence w |S ∈ δ S (s ). Hence σ Eve (pruned when leaving Core S ) achieves val Core S (s) (since all outcomes which do not leave the current core are no problem for the winning condition). We conclude that
Conversely, pick a strategy σ Eve in Core susp(s) from s which witnesses w |S ∈ val Core susp(s) (s). Pick an outcome R of σ Eve which leaves at s ∈ S S out , and let h be the smallest prefix of R reaching s . Write S = susp(s ). Then, w |S ∈ δ S (s ), that is, w |S ∈ val Core S (s ). In particular, by induction hypothesis, we get that w ∈ value(s ). For every state s ∈ S S out reachable via σ Eve , we let σ s be a strategy in E G which witnesses w from s . Then, let σ Eve be the strategy that plays according to σ Eve as long as we do not visit S S out , and switches to σ s as soon as we visit s ∈ S S out . This is not difficult to show that this strategy achieves w!
Boolean ω-regular objectives
For prefix-independent ω-regular objectives, we will use the generic approach presented previously. We assume that each payoff function payoff A is associated with a prefix-independent Boolean (ω-regular) objective Ω A over Σ. The payoff value domain D is {0, 1}. Hence, for readability we can assume that various values are taken in {0, 1} as well (instead of R).
We consider a core game Core S and a state s such that susp(s) = S. We have that (1) S ∈ val Core S (s). 7 The set of possible improvements of those values is finite (try to assign 0 instead of 1 to every agent A ∈ S).
For each S ⊆ S, we write w[S ] for the vector (0) A∈S ∪ (1) A∈S\S . Then: w[S ] ∈ val Core S (s) = value(s) if and only if Eve has a strategy to enforce Proof. The condition (1) corresponds to a so-called generalized (conjunctive) parity condition. Thanks to [16] , the winner of a generalized conjunctive parity games can be established in coNP. It can in particular be solved in polynomial space.
Starting from the smallest sets S, we fill in exponential space a table with input a state s of E G and a subset S of the set S = susp(s), and with output 1 or 0, depending on whether Eve has a winning strategy for condition (1) . Each computation can be done in exponential space. So globally, this can be done in exponential space.
To conclude, we can state the following result: Corollary 17. One can decide in exponential space the (constrained) existence of a Nash equilibrium in a game with public signal and publicly visible payoff functions associated with parity conditions. Proof. We fix two thresholds (ν A ) A∈Agt and (ν A ) A∈Agt for the payoff.
Once all the sets value(s) for every s ∈ S Eve \ S ⊥ have been computed (in exponential space thanks to Lemma 16), we can do the following: for each payoff vector (p A ) A∈Agt which satisfies ν A ≤ p A ≤ ν A for every A ∈ Agt, first mark all states s such that p ∈ value(s), and then look for a ⊥-play which satisfies the constraint Ω A if p A = 1 and Ω c A if p A = 0, and only traverses Adam-states where each deviation to a state s is marked. This can be done in exponential space as well. There are at most exponentially many payoff vectors (p A ) A∈Agt such that ν A ≤ p A ≤ ν A for every A ∈ Agt, hence this concludes the proof of the result.
Finally we can state the following result: Theorem 18. The constrained existence problem is in EXPSPACE and EXPTIME-hard for concurrent games with public signal and publicly visible Boolean payoff functions associated with parity conditions. The lower bound holds even for Büchi conditions and two players.
Proof. Only the lower bound remains to be proven. We will use a reduction from the halting problem in an alternating linearly-bounded Turing machine.
Let M be an alternating linearly-bounded Turing machine. Let w be an input word. On reading w, the tape will be bounded by p(|w|), where p is a polynom. W.l.o.g. we rewrite w into a length-p(|w|) (completing with #), and assume it is w itself. We build a two-player turn-based game G M , which will simulate the computation of M on w. It is constructued as follows:
Initial state (q 0 , 0, w(0)) (belongs to Adam)
M is in cell 0 and contains the letter w(0)
For all j ∈ {0, . . . , p(|w|)}, (q 0 , 0, w(0)) a j,w(j) − −−− → (test, q 0 , 0, w(0), (j, w(j))) and (a j,w(j) , ) = start; State (test, q 0 , 0, w(0), (j, w(j))) belongs to Adam With that transition, Adam decides to monitor cell j, and stores the fact that it contains initially w(j). This is invisible to player Eve, who therefore will not know what Adam is monitoring. Note that we did not check here that w(j) = w(0) whenever j = 0; this will done in the next state.
We set (continue, ) = continue and (failure, ) = failure. This is a test which can fail whenever Adam is monitoring the current cell, and realizes that what
Eve claims for that cell is not correct.
State (q, i, α, (j, β)) belongs to either Eve or Adam, depending on whether q is ∨ or ∧. This is standard alternation between Eve who tries to find the correct next operation and Adam who tries to find the worst operation.
For every state (q, i, α, (j, β)) (which belongs either to Eve or to Adam), for every transition t = (q, α, α , q , d) such that 0 ≤ i + d ≤ p(|w|), there is a transition (q, i, α, (j, β)) t − → (t, q, i, α, (j, β)); (t, ) = t and this last state belongs to Eve. If there is no such transition then there is a transition (q, i, α, (j, β)) failure − −−− → fail. The next move, when it exists, is stored in the state.
Writing t = (q, α, α , q , d), for every α ∈ Σ, (t, q, i, α, (j, β))
This is the next move computation. This is where Eve has to be smart, since she has to remember what was in cell i + d (this α )! Note that Adam updates his knowledge about the cell he is monitoring...
Note: in the above game, even though the public signal hides some information, Adam has full information, since all hidden decisions have been made by him.
The payoff function for Eve is given by the reachability condition "Reach the halting state", and it is the converse for Adam. Then one can then prove the following equivalence between the Turing machine M and the constructed game: M halts on w if and only if there is a Nash equilibrium in G M from the initial state where Eve wins.
Going further.
In this section we have only considered Boolean ω-regular prefix-independent payoff functions. We easily see that we can twist Lemma 14 for, e.g. reachability properties, and obtain a very similar algorithm for Boolean payoff functions associated with reachability conditions. We can even twist it further to mix prefix-independent objectives and reachability objectives. We will not detail that here.
Somewhat more importantly, we could well extend the generic approach to the so-called ordered objectives of [9] . They are somehow finite preference relations (extending payoff functions as given here) manipulating ω-regular properties: for instance, given a finite number of ω-regular properties, the "maximise" order counts the number of objectives which are satisfied.
Finally let us comment on the public visibility of payoff functions. While it is important for quantitative objectives like mean-payoff objectives (remember the undecidability result of Theorem 5), it is not so important for Boolean objectives. Indeed we can enrich the epistemic game with extra information tracking enough information about the past for easily checking many properties in parallel. We believe we can enrich the construction by mixing with Safralike constructions, and provide an algorithm to decide the constrained existence problem for Boolean ω-regular invisible payoff functions.
Mean-payoff objectives
In this section, we assume that each payoff payoff A in G is given by a (liminf or limsup) meanpayoff function MP A that is publicly visible through the labelling : for every A ∈ Agt, there is a function
Quickly notice that the new payoff functions payoff A used in E G are also (liminf or limsup) mean-payoff functions, but since each single step in G is mimicked by two steps in E G , the corresponding weight functions needs to be doubled. This will appear in the transformation below.
First notice that we could have used the generic approach for this problem as well and apply various results of [12, 13] , but it is actually easier to follow the approach of [11] , and to transform the winning condition of Eve in E G directly to a so-called polyhedron query in a multi-dimensional mean-payoff game.
To ease the notations, we write Agt = {A i | 1 ≤ i ≤ |Agt|}. We also denote by W the maximal absolute weight appearing in G. We first define several weight functions. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ |Agt|, we define: 
For every i, we write MP −1 i for MP i and MP +1 i for MP i , where the weight taken into account is w i . We also write ι(i) = +1 if MP Ai is a limsup mean-payoff and ι(i) = −1 if MP Ai is a liminf mean-payoff.
We now show that the winning condition of Eve in E G can be expressed using these new mean-payoff functions.
Lemma 19.
Eve has a winning strategy in E G from s 0 for payoff vector p = (p A ) A∈Agt if and only if Eve has a strategy σ Eve from s 0 such that for every R ∈ out(σ Eve , s 0 ):
Proof. Pick a winning strategy σ Eve for Eve in E G from s 0 , for payoff p = (p A ) A∈Agt . In particular, payoff (out ⊥ (σ Eve , s 0 )) = p, and for all R ∈ out(σ Eve , s 0 ), for every A ∈ susp(R), payoff A (R) ≤ p A . We will show that p satisfies the constraints in the statement.
Consider first R = out ⊥ (σ Eve , s 0 ). For every A i ∈ Agt, payoff Ai (R) = p Ai . By definition of the weights in the ⊥-part of the game, we get payoff Ai (R) = MP (1) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |Agt|, u i = −u |Agt|+i = −u 2|Agt|+i ; (2) Eve has a strategy from s 0 in E G to ensure MP i ≥ u i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3|Agt|.
This above problem is known as the polyhedron problem in [13] . It is shown in this paper that if there is a solution, there is one solution whose encoding has size polynomial in the number of dimensions (here 3|Agt|), the encoding of the polyhedron (here 4|Agt|), the encoding of the maximal weight (here, log 2 (W )) and the encoding of the number of states of the game (here, O(log 2 (2 |Agt|·|V | · |Act| |Agt| 2 ·|V | )), that is = O(|Act| · |Agt| 2 · |V |)). Hence we can guess in polynomial time a possible encoding for such a solution u, check in polynomial time that it belongs to the polyhedron, and use an oracle to decide whether Eve is winning in this game. We can apply results of [37] (which show that multi-dimensional mean-payoff games can be solved in coNP) to infer that this can be done in coNEXPTIME (since E G has exponential-size and new weights have polynomial encodings). Globally, everything can therefore be done in exponential space. We therefore deduce the following result.
Theorem 21. The constrained existence problem is in NP NEXPTIME (hence in EXPSPACE) and EXPTIME-hard for concurrent games with public signal and publicly visible mean-payoff payoff functions.
The lower bound uses the result for Boolean objectives stated in Theorem 18.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied concurrent games with imperfect monitoring modelled using signals. We have given some undecidability results, even in the case of public signals, when the payoff functions are not publicly visible. We have then proposed a construction to capture single-player deviations in games with public signals, and reduced the search of Nash equilibria to the synthesis of winning strategies in a two-player turn-based games (with a rather complex winning condition though). We have applied this general framework to two classes of payoff functions, and obtained decidability results.
As further work we wish to understand better if there could be richer communication patterns which would allow representable knowledge structures for Nash equilibria and thereby the synthesis of Nash equilibria under imperfect monitoring. A source of inspiration for further work will be [28] .
A Why players should distinguish the actions they played
In this paper, to model the perfect-recall hypothesis, we define the undistinguishability relation ∼ A of player A using projection π A , which includes private actions of player A and the signal. Standardly though (see e.g. [36, 5, 22] ), the undistinguishability relation is defined using solely the signal (hence forgetting private actions). While this does not affect the recall for distributed synthesis (existence of a strategy for the grand coalition), nor for Nash equilibria (existence of a strategy profile as well), we believe this is important for more complex interactions between players (for instance for multi-agent logics like in [3] ). We will argue this point using subgame-perfect equilibria. Those are strategy profiles for which, for any history (generated or not by the main profile), the strategy profile after that history is a Nash equilibrium. Consider the game represented below, with Boolean objectives as indicated, and where vertices v 2 and v 3 cannot be distinguished by any of the two players The strategy profile σ Agt represented in bold red, and defined by σ Agt (v 0 ) = a, a , σ Agt (v 0 · a, b · v 2 ) = a, − and σ Agt (v 0 · b, b · v 3 ) = b, − , is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in our framework. Indeed, player A 1 distinguishes the two histories v 0 · a, b · v 2 and v 0 · b, b · v 3 , since she can only be in v 2 (resp. v 3 ) if she played a (resp. b). On the other hand, this is not a proper profile in the standard framework since player A 1 is not supposed to distinguish these histories. We believe this shows that standard assumptions do not properly model perfect recall.
